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INTRODUCTION
When Martha Stewart sold her shares of ImClone stock,1 little did
she know that she would become the subject of one of the most pub-
licized criminal investigations in U.S. history.2
By 2002, the high-profile criminal case was certainly not a new
concept,3 but Ms. Stewart's legal problems evidenced the evolving re-
lationship between the legal system and an increasingly aggressive
media. The investigation of insider-trading allegations against Stew-
art was so extensively covered by the press that finding an impartial
jury became a nearly impossible task.4 The case, of course, eventually
went to trial and Stewart was convicted of four counts of obstruction
ofjustice, lying to federal investigators, and conspiracy.
5
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2003, The George
Washington University. I would like to thank Professor Lawrence Fox for his guidance
both on this Comment and on lawyering in general. I would also like to thank the mem-
bers of the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law for bringing this Com-
ment to its final form, and my wife Jamie for her support during many late nights of re-
search and writing..
1 See SEC Staff Reportedly Recommending Civil Charges Against Martha Stewart, SEATrLE TIMES,
Oct. 22, 2002, at C5 ("Stewart sold nearly 4,000 shares of ImClone on Dec. 27 one day be-
fore the Food and Drug Administration announced it had rejected the biotech com-
pany's application for Erbitux, its promising cancer drug.").
2 See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Envy and Outsider Trading: The Case of Martha Stewart, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 2023, 2023 (2005) ("The trial and its aftermath generated a media
storm second only to that of OJ. Simpson.").
3 SeeJonathan M. Moses, Legal Spin Control: Ethics and Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion,
95 COLUM. L. REv. 1811, 1816-19 (1995) (documenting the history of high-profile crimi-
nal proceedings, beginning with Aaron Burr's 1807 treason trial).
4 See Constance L. Hays, Selecting Stewart Jury: How Much Publicity Is Too Much, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 23, 2004, at C5 (describing the difficulties associated with the jury selection process
in Ms. Stewart's trial).
5 Schroeder, supra note 2, at 2023.
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Interestingly, one of the most controversial legal issues of the
Stewart investigation arose not from her conviction or out of any-
thing that happened during the trial. Rather, it arose out of a deci-
sion Stewart's lawyers made before any charges were filed against her.
Fearing that excessive media coverage of the criminal investigation
would put public pressure on prosecutors and regulators to file
criminal charges, Stewart's attorneys decided to hire a public rela-
tions firm to attempt to neutralize the negative perception the public
had of their client.6 This was not a newly minted strategy, as high-
profile litigants had been hiring public relations consultants since the
early 1990s. This was the time when the media began feeding off the
growing public infatuation with criminal matters, from celebrity trials
(Mike Tyson, O.J. Simpson, etc.) to heinous crimes that invoked
strong public reaction (Jeffrey Dahmer). The intensifying media
scrutiny of high-profile criminal matters created a need among attor-
neys for assistance with advocacy in the court of public opinion. The
creation of firms specializing in "Litigation Public Relations" was the
inevitable result.
7
Stewart's attorneys hired one such litigation public relations firm
to aid in their extrajudicial legal strategy. This decision proved costly
when, during grand jury proceedings, government prosecutors
sought to discover documents and obtain testimony regarding confi-
dential communications between Stewart, her attorneys, and the pub-
lic relations firm." In In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003,
a case heard before the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York, Stewart's counsel argued that the communications
made between Stewart, the public relations firm, and the attorneys
were protected by the attorney-client privilege.9 In a somewhat un-
precedented decision, the court found that the public relations firm
fell within the scope of the privilege, and that most of the communi-
cations were in fact protected.' ° The decision was-and continues to
6 See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated Mar. 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 323 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) ("[The public relations firm]'s primary responsibility was defensive-to communi-
cate with the media in a way that would help restore balance and accuracy to the press
coverage." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
7 See Susanne A. Roschwalb & Richard A. Stack, LITIGATION PUBLIC RELATIONS: COURTING
PUBLIC OPINION, at xi-xiv (Susanne A. Roschwalb & Richard A. Stack eds., 1995) (defin-
ing and discussing the advent of litigation public relations). Roschwalb and Stack are
credited with originating the phrase "litigation public relations."
8 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 322-23.
9 Id.
10 Id. at 332.
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be-controversial because rarely has the attorney-client privilege
been extended so broadly.
Although the court's holding was limited to the specific factual
scenario presented by Stewart's case, litigation public relations firms
quickly (and predictably) disseminated news of the decision.'1 Legal
scholars have not been quite as elated. Expressing concerns that the
decision amounts to an unwarranted liberalization of the attorney-
client privilege, several authors have ultimately determined that In re
Grand Jury Subpoenas was decided incorrectly. 12 These authors, how-
ever, often fail to appreciate the unique nature of a high-profile crim-
inal case and the legal issues thereby implicated. They also fail to
consider that the attorney-client privilege has a strong foundation
built upon protections afforded by the Constitution. Such a founda-
tion cannot be ignored when analyzing an extension of the privilege
to public relations consultants, especially in the criminal context.
This Comment will address the constitutional considerations
which are at the forefront of any high-profile criminal investigation
and their relationship to the privilege extension issue. I argue that in
order to protect fair-trial and due-process rights, attorneys must be-
come advocates for their clients in the court of public opinion. Be-
cause of the complex nature of contemporary media, attorneys
should not be forced to conduct such extrajudicial advocacy on their
own. Rather, they should have the ability to engage litigation public
relations consultants with the confidence that communications with
these consultants regarding legal strategy will not be subject to gov-
ernment discovery. The court's reasoning in In re Grand Jury Subpoe-
nas, despite not expressly considering constitutional implications,
gives such an ability to defense lawyers and, accordingly, the court's
opinion is correct in its conclusion. Courts should not hesitate to fol-
low the decision's reasoning in the future.
Part I of this Comment will address whether the Constitution sup-
ports the attorney-client privilege and imparts a responsibility on at-
11 See Ann M. Murphy, Spin Control and the High-Profile Client-Should the Attorney-Client Privi-
lege Extend to Communications with Public Relations Consultants?, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 545,
563 (2005) (noting public relations firms' treatment of the decision).
12 See id. at 590 (arguing that the justifications behind the privilege weigh against extending
it to public relations consultants); see alsoJonathan M. Linas, Note, Make Me Well-Liked: In
re Grand Jury and the Extension of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Public Relations Consultants in
High Profile Criminal Cases, 19 WASH. U.J.L. & POL'Y 397, 419-20 (2005) (arguing that the
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas decision amounted to an improper extension of the privilege).
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torneys to perform extrajudicial advocacy services for their clients. 3
Part II examines, in depth, In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, to supply a
framework for applying constitutional principles to the issue of privi-
lege extension to public relations consultants. Finally, Part III ad-
dresses the criticisms regarding the reasoning used in the In re Grand
Juy Subpoenas decision and provides a constitutional justification for
why courts should not be hesitant to extend the privilege in a similar
manner in future high-profile criminal cases.
I. ATFrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND LITIGATION PUBLIC RELATIONS:
THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS
Before determining whether constitutional considerations but-
tress arguments to extend the attorney-client privilege to public rela-
tions consultants in high-profile criminal matters, it is first necessary
to determine what, if anything, the Constitution has to say about the
privilege and extrajudicial public relations activities.
A. Constitutional Protection of the Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege, a creature of the common law,14 is
recognized in some form in every jurisdiction in the United States. 
15
13 This Comment will not address any constitutional arguments for the existence of the
work-product doctrine, which is somewhat related to the attorney-client relationship.
The work-product doctrine protects from discovery certain documents prepared in an-
ticipation of litigation. Its basic rules are codified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 26(b) (3):
(3) Trial Preparation: Materials.
(A) Documents and Tangible Things. Ordinarily, a party may not discover docu-
ments and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial
by or for another party or its representative (including the other party's attorney,
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent). But... those materials may be
discovered if:
(i) they are otherwise discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1); and
(ii) the party shows that it has substantial need for the materials to prepare
its case and cannot, without undue hardship, obtain their substantial
equivalent by other means.
(B) Protection Against Disclosure. If the court orders discovery of those materials, it
must protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions,
or legal theories of a party's attorney or other representative concerning the litiga-
tion.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). The attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine may
share justifications, but for the purposes of this Comment, only the former will be dis-
cussed.
14 The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that "[e]xcept as otherwise required .... the
privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be
governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of
the United States in the light of reason and experience." FED. R. EVID. 501. State law go-
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Although defined or applied differently depending on the Circuit or
state, many courts follow Wigmore's classic formulation of the privi-
lege:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal
adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that
purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance
permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal ad-
viser, (8) except the protection be waived.
As the "oldest of the testimonial privileges protecting confidential
communications,'0 7 the attorney-client privilege obviously predates
the Constitution.'8 Nevertheless, both commentators and courts have
found constitutional support for the privilege, particularly under the
Fifth" and Sixth
2" Amendments.
2 '
verns the privilege in a civil action or proceeding "with respect to an element of a claim
or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision." Id.
15 GRAHAM C. LILLY, PRINCIPLES OF EvIDENCE 325 (4th ed. 2006).
16 See, e.g., United States v. Bisanti, 414 F.3d 168, 171 (lst Cir. 2005); Banner v. City of Flint,
99 F. App'x 29, 36 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Martin, 278 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2002);
United States v. Evans, 113 F.3d 1457, 1461 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. White, 970
F.2d 328, 334 (7th Cir. 1992); Ex parte City of Leeds, 677 So. 2d 1171, 1173 (Ala. 1996);
Sapp v. Wong, 609 P.2d 137, 140 (Haw. 1980); In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790, 794 (Ill.
1988). Several of these cases cite 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
A Federal Rule of Evidence defining the privilege was proposed, but ultimately re-
jected. See LILLY, supra note 15, at 327 (discussing the proposed Rule 503(b) and noting
its broad definition of the privilege).
17 EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE A'rrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT
DOCTRINE 2 (4th ed. 2001).
18 See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66
CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1070 (1978) (explaining that the privilege originated in the Elizabe-
than period in England). Interestingly, Hazard also explains that recognition of the privi-
lege, in its modem form, did not begin to develop even in England until after 1800. Id.
Hazard's historical analysis may suggest that the attorney-client privilege was developed in
America under the same philosophical framework used to aid early interpretation of the
Constitution. This is (thankfully) beyond the scope of this Comment.
19 The Fifth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "No person shall.., be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law... ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
20 The Sixth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a. . . public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and dis-
trict wherein the crime shall have been committed,... and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
21 See Heidi Boghosian, Taint Teams and Firewalls: Thin Armor for Attorney-Client Privilege, 1
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICSJ. 15, 17 (2003) ("Today the attorney-client privilege in-
vokes several constitutional principles, including the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel ..., the Fifth Amendment right to have due process of law, which includes the right
of... the effective and substantial aid of counsel, and the right against self-
incrimination . . . ."); Timothy P. Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 68
(2002) ("Modem commentators have contended that the privilege is necessary to pre-
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On its face, the Fifth Amendment offers perhaps the clearest sup-
port for the attorney-client privilege. One author has noted that
"[e]arly American criminal courts and legal scholars viewed the [at-
torney-client] privilege as an outgrowth of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. 22 The link is clear. The benefits
associated with the attorney-client privilege arise from its ability to fa-
cilitate open attorney-client communications.23 These benefits would
cease to exist if a client's preexisting Fifth Amendment rights were
forfeited merely because he or she divulged incriminating informa-
tion to counsel.24  Some scholars have even gone so far as to argue
serve a criminal defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and
Sixth Amendment right to counsel." (footnotes omitted)); Norman K. Thompson &
Joshua E. Kastenberg, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Practical Military Applications of a Profes-
sional Core Value, 49 A.F. L. REV. 1, 34 (2000) ("Several state courts note while the attor-
ney-client privilege is not per se of constitutional origin, the privilege nonetheless has
important constitutional implications."). But see Robert P. Mosteller, Child Abuse Reporting
Laws and Attorney-Client Confidences: The Reality and the Specter of Lawyer as Informant, 42
DUKE L.J. 203, 269 (1992) ("Although often associated with constitutional rights and cer-
tainly protected at its core by at least the Sixth Amendment, most of the breadth and
sweep of the attorney-client privilege is without constitutional protection."); Paul R. Rice,
Attorney-Client Privilege: The Eroding Concept of Confidentiality Should Be Abolished, 47 DUKE
L.J. 853, 881 (1998) ("[T]he attorney-client privilege is not a constitutionally guaranteed
right.").
22 Thompson & Kastenberg, supra note 21, at 4.
23 See Steven Goode, Identity, Fees, and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 307,
314 (1991) (noting that the benefits of the attorney-client privilege are "said to flow"
from its ability to enhance open communication between attorneys and their clients); see
also Vincent S. Walkowiak, An Overview of the Attorney-Client Privilege When the Client Is a Cor-
poration, in ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL LITIGATION: PROTEcTING AND
DEFENDING CONFIDENTIALITY 2 (Vincent S. Walkowiak ed., 3d ed. 2004) (arguing that a
broad interpretation of the privilege is necessary because disclosure by clients to their at-
torneys will be chilled if the disclosed information is made available to those with adverse
legal interests).
24 The attorney-client privilege preserves a client's Fifth Amendment rights when he or she
discloses incriminating information to his or her counsel, ultimately resulting in in-
creased attorney-client communications. See Hazard, supra note 18, at 1061 ("[T]he ad-
vocate can adequately prepare a case only if the client is free to disclose everything, bad
as well as good."); see also David E. Seidelson, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Client's Consti-
tutional Rights, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 693, 726-27 (1978). Seidelson's article examines Fisher
v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), in which the Supreme Court determined that a sub-
poena against taxpayers' attorneys requiring disclosure of incriminating documents did
not violate the taxpayers' Fifth Amendment rights, even though those rights would have
been violated if the documents were still in the hands of the taxpayers. However, the
Court also determined that if the documents could not have been obtained by subpoena
from the taxpayers due to Fifth Amendment considerations, and they were disclosed to
the attorneys in order to obtain legal advice, the attorney-client privilege would prevent
disclosure of the documents by the attorneys. Id. at 405. Seidelson argues that "if client's
[F]ifth [A]mendment right is not to be vitiated simply because he retains counsel and
transfers possession of the documents to counsel..., it would seem that the attorney-
[Vol. 10:4
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that the federal government's growing attempts to circumvent the at-
torney-client privilege' may lead to the evisceration of Fifth Amend-
ment rights.
2 6
Additionally, the Fifth Amendment supports a constitutional at-
torney-client privilege for reasons beyond self-incrimination issues.
For example, courts have suggested that the due process component"
of the Fifth Amendment "includes the right of one accused of crime
to have the effective and substantial aid of counsel." 28 The attorney-
client privilege is necessary to give this right substance because it
would be impossible for a lawyer to counsel a client effectively or sub-
stantially without the level of frank and open communications en-
sured by the privilege.2 9 This relationship between the due process
requirement and the attorney-client privilege coincides with one
widely accepted justification for the attorney-client privilege: it
should result in the client sharing more information with the attor-
ney, who, in turn, gives more informed and effective advice to the cli-
ent. 0 Although the privilege may ultimately prevent full discovery in
client privilege is simply the verbalization utilized by the Court to preserve client's preex-
isting [F]ifth [A]mendment right." Seidelson, supra, at 726-27.
25 These attempts include a Bureau of Prisons Rule promulgated shortly after September
11 th, which authorizes the review of communications made between inmates and their at-
torneys, Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 66 FED. REG. 55,062 (Oct. 31,
2001) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pts. 500-501), as well as the recent prosecutorial prac-
tice of requiring waiver of the attorney-client privilege as a condition of accepting a global
settlement agreement, Jared Edward Mitchem, Comment, Parallel Proceedings: Concurrent
Qui Tam and Grand Jury Litigation, 51 ALA. L. REV. 391, 405-06 (1999).
26 See, e.g., PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS & LAWRENCE M. STRATTON, THE TYRANNY OF GOOD
INTENTIONS: HOW PROSECUTORS AND BUREAUCRATS ARE TRAMPLING THE CONSTITUTION
IN THE NAME OFJUSTICE 105-07 (2000) (arguing that government prosecutors have jeop-
ardized the self-incrimination safeguards of the Constitution by eroding the attorney-
client privilege).
27 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
28 Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (citing Neufield v. United
States, 118 F.2d 375, 383 (D.C. Cir. 1941)). The due process rights within the Fifth
Amendment may also include "a fair opportunity [for an accused] to secure counsel of
his own choice." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932).
29 For this reason, the due process rights afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment are also
intertwined with the attorney-client privilege. See Eric D. McArthur, Comment, The Search
and Seizure of Privileged Attorney-Client Communications, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 736 (2005)
("Courts have also recognized that government invasions of the attorney-client privilege
can deprive an individual of due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.").
Because the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited to criminal cases, it may create a right
to effective counsel in civil cases. SeeJennifer Cunningham, Note, Eliminating "Backdoor"
Access to Client Confidences: Restricting the Self-Defense Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege,
65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 992, 1003 n.65 (1990).
30 See Lory A. Barsdate, Note, Attorney-Client Privilegefor the Government Entity, 97 YALE L.J.
1725, 1729-30 (1988) ("The client will speak freely with his attorney when assured that
May 2008]
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a criminal matter, it promotes due process by fostering better-
informed counsel, more efficient judicial processes, and greater obe-
dience to the law.s'
The Fifth Amendment rights implicated by the attorney-client pri-
vilege feed off of the assistance of counsel right provided by the Sixth
Amendment. Unless a citizen had a right to the assistance of counsel,
there would be no need to preserve his or her Fifth Amendment
32rights in the face of consultations with counsel . While scholars may
debate whether the Fifth Amendment alone provides a constitutional
basis for the attorney-client privilege, 3 few dispute that the Sixth
his revelations will not be disclosed without his consent; in turn, this communication al-
lows the attorney to provide informed advice and to function effectively in the adversary
legal system." (footnote omitted)).
31 See Goode, supra note 23, at 315-16. Goode argues that the privilege creates judicial effi-
ciency in a variety of ways. To begin, it allows lawyers to raise valid defenses that they
might not otherwise employ. Also, when a defendant's lawyer is well informed, the likeli-
hood of ambush at trial is decreased. Moreover, fewer cases will actually go to trial when
the attorney is accurately informed about the merits of a case. Goode further argues that
a client will be more likely to reveal a plan to engage in illegal activity to his attorney with
the knowledge that the communications are protected. This allows the attorney to coun-
sel the client adequately and to discourage him or her from proceeding further, perhaps
successfully.
These arguments generally provide the basis for the "utilitarian" justification for the
privilege. See, e.g., David A. Nelson, Comment, Attorney-Client Privilege and Procedural Safe-
guards: Are They Worth the Costs, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 368, 383-84 (1992). Nelson explains
that:
Although created to protect the attorney from forced violation of his oath of se-
crecy to the client, it is now well established that the purpose behind the privilege
is to promote full and open communication between the attorney and client. As a
result of this communication, an attorney will be better able to represent his client
in a competent manner. The attorney-client privilege also promotes "broader
public interests in the observance of law and administration of justice" by provid-
ing the attorney and client with a confidential forum in which to communicate
and resolve the client's problem. While the privilege may suppress important evi-
dence, it has been determined that the need to allow the attorney to provide
sound legal advice generally outweighs any disadvantage of withholding evidence
in a particular case. For these reasons, the attorney-client privilege is one of the
cornerstones of our judicial system.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
32 See Seidelson, supra note 24, at 713. Jeffrey A. DeLand explains that the "constitutional
policy underlying the existence of the privilege is self-evident: to afford a client the free-
dom from fear of compulsory disclosure of information divulged in consultation with
counsel so that the client will feel free to impart all relevant information essential to ef-
fective legal counselling [sic]." Jeffrey A. DeLand, Comment, Extending the Attorney-Client
Privilege: A Constitutional Mandate, 13 PAC. L.J. 437, 442 (1982) (footnote omitted).
33 See Deborah Stavile Bartel, Drawing Negative Inferences upon a Claim of the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1355, 1361 (1995) ("To the extent the attorney-client privi-
lege is thought to have a constitutional basis in current American law, it appears to be
grounded in the [S]ixth [A]mendment right to counsel-not in the [F]ifth
[A] mendment right against self-incrimination."); see also In reShargel, 742 F.2d 61, 63 (2d
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Amendment right to counsel would have little meaning without the
privilege. 4 Indeed, some authors have referred to the privilege as the
"cornerstone of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.0
5
By contrast, the Supreme Court has not had much occasion to
pontificate on the correlation between the Sixth Amendment and the
36privilege, though former Chief Justice Rehnquist observed on one
occasion that "the Sixth Amendment, of course, protects the confi-
dentiality of communications between the accused and his attor-
Cir. 1984) ("While the attorney-client privilege historically arose at the same time as the
privilege against self-incrimination, it was early established that the privileges had distinct
policies and that the 'point of honor'-the attorney's reluctance to incriminate his cli-
ent-was not a valid reason to invoke the attorney-client privilege.").
34 There is an abundance of scholarly work noting the relationship between the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee of the assistance of counsel and the attorney-client privilege.
See, e.g., Marjorie Cohn, The Evisceration of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Wake of September
11, 2001, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1233, 1240 (2003) (arguing that the Sixth Amendment ne-
cessitates the protection of confidential attorney-client communications); Thompson &
Kastenberg, supra note 21, at 34-38 (arguing that an accused person's Sixth Amendment
rights are violated when they are denied the full extent of the attorney-client privilege);
Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOwA L. REV. 351, 357 (1989) (explaining
that the privilege has constitutional support because it helps sustain criminal defendants'
trust and aids effective representation); Joshua T. Friedman, Note, The Sixth Amendment,
Attorney-Client Relationship and Government Intrusions: Who Bears the Unbearable Burden of
Proving Prejudice?, 40 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 109, 123 (1991) (finding difficulty
in imagining an effective right to counsel without the existence of the attorney-client
privilege); Nelson, supra note 31, at 414-15 (positing that the Sixth Amendment creates a
constitutional guarantee of the attorney-client privilege); see also Bartel, supra note 33, at
1391-92 (arguing that the practice of certain courts, allowing a negative inference when a
defendant invokes the attorney-client privilege, may be a violation of the Sixth Amend-
ment).
35 David S. Krakoff & Christopher F. Regan, The Hidden Cost to Corporate Settlements of Envi-
ronmental Prosecutions-Is It Worth the Price?, SD19 A.L.I.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC.
103, 110 (1998).
36 See Ellen S. Podgor & John Wesley Hall, Government Surveillance of Attorney-Client Communi-
cations: Invoked in the Name of Fighting Terrorism, 17 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 145, 158 (2003)
(pointing out that the Supreme Court has never expressly held that attorney-client confi-
dentiality is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment); Shawn P. Bailey, Comment, How Se-
crets Are Kept: Viewing the Current Clergy-Penitent Privilege Through a Comparison with the Attor-
ney-Client Privilege, 2002 B.Y.U. L. REV. 489, 522 (noting the lack of Supreme Court
guidance regarding the constitutional dimensions of the privilege).
In Moran v. Burbine, the Supreme Court addressed the Sixth Amendment-privilege
relationship in analyzing when the constitutional right to counsel is first triggered. The
Court held that the mere existence of an attorney-client relationship does not trigger
Sixth Amendment protections prior to a formal interrogation, reasoning that "The Sixth
Amendment's intended function is not to wrap a protective cloak around the attorney-
client relationship for its own sake any more than it is to protect a suspect from the con-
sequences of his own candor." 475 U.S. 412, 430 (1986). It appears that the issue ad-
dressed by the Court in Moran was whether an attorney-client relationship triggers Sixth
Amendment rights, rather than whether the Sixth Amendment supports the existence of
an attorney-client privilege.
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ney. '' 1 Other courts have weighed in on the matter, finding that
Sixth Amendment rights are ensured by the privilege. For example,
the Third Circuit, in United States v. Levy, explained:
The fundamental justification for the [S]ixth [A]mendment right to
counsel is the presumed inability of a defendant to make informed
choices about the preparation and conduct of his defense. Free two-way
communication between client and attorney is essential if the profes-
sional assistance guaranteed by the [S]ixth [A]mendment is to be mean-
ingful. The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is inextricably linked
to the very integrity and accuracy of the fact finding process itself.
Other circuits have also expressly found a Sixth Amendment
foundation for the attorney-client privilege.3 9 Accordingly, while it is
not entirely settled, there appears to be ample support for the notion
that the attorney-client privilege is indispensable to the right to effec-
tive counsel.
Regardless of their implications when considered apart, the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments, considered together, all but mandate the ex-
istence of the attorney-client privilege.40  Without the effect of the
privilege, the Amendments would operate "mutually exclusive" to
one another in criminal proceedings.4 ' In an oft-cited Note, the Har-
vard Law Review described this argument:
[W]hen the [F]ifth and [S]ixth amendments are considered together,
the individual accused of crime does seem to have a right to attorney-
client privilege. Without a right to privilege, the exercise of either consti-
tutional right would require a waiver of the other. To preserve his right
against self-incrimination, the defendant would have to forgo communi-
cating with an attorney, lest the communication be subpenaed [sic].
37 United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 295 (1980) (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
38 577 F.2d 200, 209 (3d Cir. 1978).
39 See, e.g., Greater Newburyport Clamshell Alliance v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H., 838 F.2d 13,
19 (1st Cir. 1988) ("The [S]ixth [A]mendment provides a shield for the attorney-client
privilege... in criminal proceedings....").
40 See Max D. Stem & David Hoffman, Privileged Informers: The Attorney Subpoena Problem and
a Proposal for Reform, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1783, 1806 (1988) ("Several commentators have
suggested that the [S]ixth [A]mendment right to counsel, when taken together with the
[F]ifth [A]mendment's protection against forced self-incrimination, makes the attorney-
client privilege a constitutional imperative."); Joel D. Whitley, Comment, Protecting State
Interests: Recognition of the State Government Attorney-Client Privilege, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 1533,
1556 n.138 (2005) (noting that the combination of rights afforded by the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments provides a constitutional basis for the attorney-client privilege in criminal
trials).
41 See Michel Rosenfeld, The Transformation of the Attorney-Client Privilege: In Search of an Ideo-
logical Reconciliation of Individualism, the Adversary System, and the Corporate Client's SEC Dis-
closure Obligations, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 495, 511 (1982) ("[T]he attorney-client privilege is
necessary if the right against self-incrimination and the right to counsel are not to be-
come mutually exclusive.").
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Similarly, to enjoy even the most minimal use of his right to an attorney,
the defendant would have to surrender his testimony to the court. Yet,
neither of these restrictions can be permitted.4 "
Thus, outside of any theoretical justification-and there are many
of those, to be sure-a plain reading of the two Amendments appears
to provide an implicit guarantee of the attorney-client privilege.45
Such a rationale is what is known as the "non-utilitarian" justification
of the privilege."
B. Constitutional Considerations Regarding Attorneys'Extrajudicial Public
Relations Activities
It would be difficult to argue that the Constitution vests a person
accused of a crime with the right to general public relations assis-
tance. However, the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a fair trial
45
and the assistance of counsel in criminal proceedings may necessitate
extrajudicial media activity by attorneys. This is because the ever-
expanding scope of intense media coverage of high-profile crimes
42 Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional Entitlement, 91
HARv. L. REV. 464, 485-86 (1977).
43 Id. at 480 ("[The] attorney-client privilege may be viewed as a right implicitly guaranteed
by the United States Constitution through the [F]ifth [A]mendment safeguard against
self-incrimination and the [S]ixth [A]mendment right to an attorney in criminal trials.");
see also Hazard, supra note 18, at 1062 (conceding that without the attorney-client privi-
lege, "[d]efense counsel would become a medium of confession, a result that would sub-
stantially impair both the accused's right to counsel and the privilege against self-
incrimination"); Robert P. Mosteller, Discovery Against the Defense: Tilting the Adversarial
Balance, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1567, 1573 (1986) (arguing that constitutional protections
should prevent states from narrowly defining the attorney-client privilege).
44 See Thompson & Kastenberg, supra note 21, at 4. It is important to note this distinction.
As will be discussed in Part III, infra, although the "utilitarian" view is the prevailing con-
temporary theory, see Bartel, supra note 33, at 1364, the "non-utilitarian" view is based
upon stronger reasoning, which supports the notion that the privilege should be ex-
tended to public relations consultants in certain situations.
45 The Sixth Amendment affords a criminal defendant the right to a fair trial by explicitly
guaranteeing the right to trial by an impartialjury. See Marcy Strauss, Sequestration, 24 AM.
J. CRIM. L. 63, 78 (1996) (discussing the impartiality requirement as the foundation for
the guarantee of a fair trial). The right to the assistance of counsel is necessary to secure
the fair trial guarantee. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) ("[A] provi-
sion of the Bill of Rights which is 'fundamental and essential to a fair trial' is made obliga-
tory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. We think the Court in Betts was
wrong... in concluding that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is not one of
these fundamental rights."): Martin R. Gardner, The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and
Its Underlying Values: Defining the Scope of Privay Protection, 90J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
397, 399 (2000) ("The most prominent value bottoming the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel provision is the concern for providing fair trials for criminal defendants.").
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continually threatens to jeopardize the ability of an accused to
46achieve his or her right to a fair trial.
This threat is two-fold. On one hand, statements made to the me-
dia by prosecutors, in addition to the media coverage itself, have both
the purpose and the ability to contaminate the potential jury pool.
Some commentators have noted that the "concern that legal scholars
and judges have identified," regarding the right to a fair trial, "is that
the public, through the jury system, will have tried and convicted a
defendant before the trial has occurred. '' 47 Despite ethical considera-
tions and bar association rules, time and time again government
prosecutors have made extrajudicial statements implying the guilt of
high-profile defendants with impunity.
4s
The other threat to the fair-trial right comes when the process
works in reverse. Excessive media coverage can result in a severe
amount of public pressure on prosecutors to bring initial (or addi-
tional) charges where an accused person may normally not face
criminal punishment or face only low-level criminal charges.49 Jona-
46 See Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., "May It Please the Camera, ... I Mean the Court"--An Intrajudicial
Solution to an Extrajudicial Problem, 39 GA. L. REV. 83, 94 (2004) ("Throughout our nation's
history, the potential effect of publicity on a criminal defendant's constitutional right to a
fair trial has been the source of much concern."); Judith L. Maute, "In Pursuit ofJustice" in
High Profile Criminal Matters, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1745, 1746 (2002) ("In pursuit of jus-
tice, especially in high profile criminal cases .... defense teams... constantly must be
vigilant about threats to the underlying fairness of the proceedings posed by excessive
media coverage."); Jaime N. Morris, Note, The Anonymous Accused: Protecting Defendants'
Rights in High-Profile Criminal Cases, 44 B.C. L. REV. 901, 902 (2003) ("Depending on the
story the media relays to the public, the intense media coverage surrounding high-profile
criminal cases can ... destroy a defendant's chances for a fair trial . . ").
47 Mawiyah Hooker & Elizabeth Lange, Current Development, Limiting Extrajudicial Speech in
High-Profile Cases: The Duty of the Prosecutor and Defense Attorney in Their Pre-Trial Communica-
tions with the Media, 16 GEO.J. LEGAL ETHICS 655, 664 (2003).
48 See Brown, supra note 46, at 126-30 (recounting ethically questionable statements made
by government prosecutors in the cases of OJ. Simpson, Scott Peterson, John Walker
Lindh, and Michael Jackson).
49 See Deniza Gertsberg, Comment, Should Public Relations Experts ever Be Privileged Persons ?, 31
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1443, 1462 (2004) (arguing that strong public reaction to a crime can
result in aggravated charges).
An example of this phenomenon was the Michael Vick dog-fighting investigation. See
Clifton Brown, Dogfeghting Charges Filed Against Falcons' Vick, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2007, at
DI (discussing the indictment filed by prosecutors against Michael Vick). From the ini-
tial rumblings regarding Vick's role in a dog-fighting ring, the media was absolutely
flooded by stories about the investigation. Vick's indictment on multiple charges may
have been appropriate, but it is difficult to say if the investigation would have reached the
same conclusion if it were not for Vick's high-profile status. David Cornwell, a sports and
entertainment lawyer who previously served as assistant general counsel to the National
Football League, argued that
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than Moses notes, in the corporate context, that an issue regarding
fair-trial rights arises because of the "wide discretion given prosecu-
tors in deciding whether a corporate violation is a civil or criminal
matter.'' ° As such, Moses argues that "counsel need to limit public
pressure on government officials in order to limit the escalation of
charges."5  In the context of an individual accused of a crime, this
need is just as great.5'
The First Amendment makes it unlikely that the media's access
to-and coverage of-criminal investigations will be limited in the fu-
ture. Ethical rules have had little effect in preventing prosecutors
from making statements about defendants that will skew the public's
view of their guilt. Thus, the only remaining option to ensure a fair
trial is for the accused to seek a defense in the "court" of public opin-
ion. That requires the aid of a lawyer. The Sixth Amendment right
to the assistance of counsel, in conjunction with due-process and fair-
trial rights, would seem to require attorneys to actively seek to coun-
terbalance a client's negative public image. In high-profile cases,
"the only way some lawyers can offer clients their Sixth Amendment
right to a fair trial.., is to set the record straight in the media in
hopes that accurate reporting will create a neutral litigation envi-
ronment. 5 3 In other words, to assure a fair trial, public advocacy is
an essential part of a defense strategy.
5 4
[B]oth the state prosecutors and the federal prosectutors [sic] were influenced by
Michael's celebrity in the manner in which they pursued their investigation and
the ultimate indictment. Once it became a federal case.... the judge treated Mi-
chael as he would any other defendant. In fact, at the arraignment the judge went
to great pains to guarantee Michael and the public that Michael would be treated
fairly. Michael's celebrity had more of an impact on law enforcement and the
prosecutors ....
ESPN.com, Chat with David Cornwell, http://proxy.espn.go.com/chat/chatESPN?event
_id=18435 (last visited Jan. 10, 2008).
50 Jonathan M. Moses, Note, Legal Spin Control: Ethics and Advocacy in the Court of Public Opin-
ion, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1811, 1833 (1995).
51 Id.
52 It is arguable that media-fueled public pressure poses more of a threat to due process
rights than to the right to a fair trial. Without delving too deeply into criminal proce-
dure, it is clear that the number and severity of charges brought against an accused per-
son can affect the fairness of a trial by skewing the jury's perception of the defendant.
Whether the fair-trial right or due-process rights are implicated, constitutional protec-
tions are implicated by excessive media coverage of a crime because of the discretion af-
forded to prosecutors. See id. at 1837-38.
53 Steven B. Hantler et al., Extending the Privilege to Litigation Communications Specialists in the
Age of Trial By Media, 13 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 7, 16 (2004). It is important to note that
the Sixth Amendment fair-trial right, even under its most liberal interpretation, appears
only to protect the attorney's extrajudicial activities aimed at leveling public perception
to a neutral point. A defense attorney's media campaign that is not responsive to nega-
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Bar associations appear to agree. For example, ABA Model Rule
of Professional Conduct 3.6(c) provides that:
[A] lawyer may make a statement that a reasonable lawyer would believe
is required to protect a client from the substantial undue prejudicial ef-
fect of recent publicity not initiated by the lawyer or the lawyer's client.
A statement made pursuant to this paragraph shall be limited to such in-., 55
formation as is necessary to mitigate the recent adverse publicity.
Commentators have explained that a "criminal client's right to a
fair trial and effective counsel under the Sixth Amendment is the pol-
icy basis for the 'public right of reply' that bar associations have rec-
ognized, particularly as applied to defense lawyers, in their ethics
rules."56
Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion in Gentile v. State Bar of Ne-
vada 5 7 seems to concur. The case addressed the propriety of sanc-
tions imposed on an attorney by the Nevada State Bar for making ex-
trajudicial statements in favor of his client to the press. The case
turned primarily on an interpretation of the governing Nevada rule
and a consideration of the attorney's First Amendment rights. Justice
Kennedy, however, noted that the lawyer "sought only to stop a wave
of publicity he perceived as prejudicing potential jurors against his
client" and, thus, held that the attorney's speech did not violate the
ethical limitations imposed by the applicable rule. 9 Later in the
opinion, he wrote that "in some circumstances press comment is nec-
essary to protect the rights of the client and prevent abuse of the
courts.
Viewed in this light, extrajudicial activity is necessary to preserve
constitutional rights in certain situations. The attorney-client privi-
tive media coverage or prosecutorial statements probably finds no footing on the fair-trial
right. Similarly, a campaign commenced by a defense attorney that negatively portrays
the victim of a crime appears to be not only without a Sixth Amendment basis, but it may
also seriously impinge upon the victim's rights.
54 See, e.g., Gertsberg, supra note 49, at 1463 and accompanying footnotes (explaining that
defense attorneys have become concerned that if they do not act in the court of public
opinion, they may jeopardize their clients' fair-trial rights or put their clients in the dan-
gerous position of defending themselves in the media).
.55 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 3.6 (2003).
56 Hantler et al., supra note 53, at 16.
57 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
58 Id. at 1033 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). The lawyer was accused of violating a Nevada rule
analogous to ABA Model Rule 3.6, as it then existed.
59 Id. at 1043.
60 Id. at 1058. But cf Moses, supra note 50, at 1826 (arguing that although Gentile recog-
nized the constitutional underpinnings of extrajudicial advocacy, it did not directly "de-
cide when, if or how lawyers should advocate in the court of public opinion").
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lege-vital to the protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments-
should, therefore, apply to any communications made between attor-
neys and clients for the purpose of facilitating the neutralization of
public perception or similar activities. Whether that privilege should
further extend to consultants hired by attorneys to assist with those
functions is the subject of the next two Sections.
II. EXTENDING THE PRIVILEGE TO PUBLIC RELATIONS CONSULTANTS:
IN RE GRAADJURY SUBPOENAS AND RELATED DECISIONS
Judge Kaplan's opinion in In re Grand Jury Subpoenas61 offers little
in the way of constitutional analysis. Nevertheless, an examination of
the decision and other related cases provides a working framework to
address the issue of extending the attorney-client privilege to litiga-
tion public relations consultants. This Part is not meant to be an all-
encompassing survey of the relevant case law, but rather, it is meant
to illuminate the unique issues and law at play when determining if
an extension of the privilege is constitutionally supported.
A. United States v. Kovel
The grandfather of the public-relations privilege cases is un-
doubtedly United States v. Kovel,62 a case decided by the Second Circuit
over forty years ago. Louis Kovel, a former IRS agent, appealed a
sentence for criminal contempt that he received for his refusal to an-
swer several questions asked during grand jury proceedings. 4 He was
before the grand jury to provide testimony regarding alleged tax vio-
lations by a client of his employer, a law firm.6' After two days of con-
tinued refusal to answer any of the questions posed to him, Kovel was
held in contempt, sentenced to a year in prison, and denied bail.66
On appeal, Judge Friendly began his analysis by stating that:
Nothing in the policy of the privilege suggests that attorneys, simply by
placing accountants, scientists or investigators on their payrolls and
maintaining them in their offices, should be able to invest all communi-
61 265 F. Supp. 2d 321 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). The Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether
public relations consultants can fall within the scope of the privilege.
62 See Linas, supra note 12, at 404 ("United States v. Kovel is the pre-eminent case granting
attorney-client priilege to accountants." (footnote omitted)).
63 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961). This case is, for all intents and purposes, the starting point
for analyzing the extension of the attorney-client privilege to third parties.
64 Id. at 919.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 920.
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cations by clients to such persons with a privilege the law has not seen fit
67
to extend when the latter are operating under their own steam.
However, he then noted that "the complexities of modern exis-
tence" made it impossible for attorneys to adequately counsel clients
without the assistance of certain indispensable employees.8 As an ex-
ample, Judge Friendly noted the need for a translator in the case of a
foreign-language-speaking client, and identified four manners in
which the three-person communications could take place.6 9 Each hy-
pothetical communication, Judge Friendly argued, would fall within
the boundaries of "Wigmore's famous formulation" of the attorney-
client privilege. 0
Drawing on the translator analogy, Judge Friendly explained that,
quite often, accounting concepts might as well be a foreign language
to those not in the accounting profession, including attorneys.7'
Thus, whether an accountant, such as Kovel, is present during attor-
ney-client communications regarding a complex tax issue, or whether
the client first explains his story to an accountant hired by the attor-
ney, who then interprets it to the attorney, the attorney-client privi-
lege should not be considered waived if all communications are made
with the end goal of obtaining legal advice.7 2 "If what is sought is not
legal advice but only accounting service," Judge Friendly wrote, "or if
the advice sought is the accountant's rather than the lawyer's, no
privilege exists.,
73
The Kovel approach has found acceptance in nearly every federal
circuit.74 Although normally applied in cases involving an account-
ant, courts have routinely used the "translator" analysis to determine
67 Id. at 921.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 921-22. The formulation is as follows:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser
in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made
in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7)
from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be
waived.
Id. (quoting 8 WIGMORE, supra note 16, at 554); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 17, at 45-46
(citing 8 WIGMORE, supra note 16, at 554).
71 Kovel, 265 F.2d at 922 ("Accounting concepts are a foreign language to some lawyers in
almost all cases, and to almost all lawyers in some cases.").
72 Id. ("What is vital to the privilege is that the communication be made in confidence for the
purpose of obtaining legal advice from the lauyer.").
73 Id.
74 SeeJoseph W. Martini & Charles F. Willson, Defending Your Client in the Court of Public Opin-
ion, CHAMPION, Apr. 2004, at 20, 21 (citing decisions of the First, Second, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits).
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extension of the privilege to other types of professionals. 75 Judge
Kaplan relied heavily on Kovel in deciding In re Grand Jury Subpoenas.
B. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 24, 2003
Upon being decided, In re Grand Jury Subpoenas did not send
shockwaves through the federal court system, but it has been referred
to as a breakthrough in some scholarly circles." In the case, Judge
Lewis A. Kaplan considered a motion filed by the United States At-
torney's Office in relation to its grand jury investigation of a high-
profile "Target."7s The "Target," of course, was none other than Mar-
tha Stewart, who was facing a variety of charges arising from her sale
of ImClone stock shortly before it was announced that the FDA would
not approve the drug.79 In relation to the charges, Stewart's attorneys
had enlisted the services of a public relations firm "out of a concern
that 'unbalanced and often inaccurate press reports about [Stewart]
created a clear risk that the prosecutors and regulators ... would feel
public pressure to bring some kind of charge against' her., 80  Gov-
ernment prosecutors subsequently served grand jury subpoenas both
on the public relations firm and on an individual employee of the
firm.8' The firm refused to produce the requested documents, claim-
ing attorney-client privilege and work product protection, and the
employee, while answering some questions, asserted that the attorney-
client privilege prevented her from answering others.82 The court was
75 See, e.g., United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 1999) (rejecting extension of the
privilege to an investment banker); Dorf & Stanton Commc'ns, Inc. v. Molson Breweries,
100 F.3d 919 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (analyzing extension of the privilege to a public relations
firm employed by a brewery and finding that the firm failed to establish that its notes
were protected); In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929 (8th Cir. 1994) (analyzing extension of the
privilege to an independent contractor and finding that the privilege applied to commu-
nications between the consultant and the client's lawyers); Sunnyside Manor, Inc. v.
Township of Wall, No. 02-2902 (MLC), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36438 (D.N.J. Dec. 23,
2005) (analyzing extension of the privilege to an engineer and finding that because he
served as an interpreter for the client, the privilege was invoked).
76 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 325-26 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
77 See, e.g., Hantler et al., supra note 53, at 28 (labeling In re Grand Juiy Subpoenas as a "break-
through case"); see also Gertsberg, supra note 49, at 1466 (characterizing the decision as
groundbreaking").
78 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 322-24.
79 For a well-constructed history of the charges, see Michael L. Seigel & Christopher Slobo-
gin, Prosecuting Martha: Federal Prosecutorial Power and the Need for a Law of Counts, 109
PENN ST. L. REV. 1107, 1107-18 (2005).
80 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 323.
81 Id. at 322.
82 Id. at 322-23.
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called upon to determine whether any of the communications at is-
sue were protected by the privilege or constituted work product.
Judge Kaplan's opinion analyzed the problem with explicit refer-
ence to the fact that the underlying case was a "high profile matter.,
83
It noted that the public relations firm was serving a primarily defen-
sive purpose, with the ultimate goal of neutralizing "the [litigation]
environment in a way that would enable prosecutors and regulators
to make their decisions and exercise their discretion without undue
influence from the negative press coverage."84 The actual activities of
the public relations firm took several forms. On some occasions, the
employee spoke or corresponded directly with Stewart, or Stewart's
attorneys communicated directly with the public relations firm. 5
Other times, all three parties (Stewart, her attorneys, and employees
from the public relations firm) were present.88 Of the documents re-
viewed in camera by Judge Kaplan, some were found to contain discus-
sions regarding defense strategies, and the court found "no reason to
doubt" that the oral communications at issue contained similar sub-
87jects. However, the court also noted that the activities of the public
relations firm also included speaking with the media, in some cases to
"find out what they knew and... where the information came
from."
88
The court then applied the Kovel analysis to frame the actual issue
presented by the parties. 9 The court noted that there was no sugges-
tion that the communications would have been privileged had Stew-
art simply hired the public relations firm to provide general advice on
how to deal with the media.90 Rather, the court accepted the notion
that the firm was hired by Stewart's lawyers to specifically serve her
legal interests. 9' Since few lawyers could claim to have expertise in
handling the aggressive media that comes along with a high-profile
celebrity criminal case, 92 the court found that this was an area where,
83 Id. at 323.
84 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting the testifying employee's affidavit).
85 Id. at 324.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 326.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 This is not to say that attorneys who possess some expertise in the public relations arena
do not exist. However, Ms. Stewart's case involved a very particular public relations strat-
egy: neutralizing the incredible amount of negative media coverage that increased the
chances of her indictment. An attorney may be well versed in speaking before the media,
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in Kove's words, counsel required "outside help." Thus, the issue to
be decided was "whether attorney efforts to influence public opinion
in order to advance the client's legal position.., are services, the
rendition of which also should be facilitated by applying the privilege
to relevant communications which have this as their object."9 3 The
court was deciding whether, in the context of this case, public rela-
tions advice was a necessary component of a legal strategy. If the an-
swer was yes, and Stewart's attorneys could not provide this advice
without the assistance of the public relations firm, then communica-
tions with the firm made for the purpose of developing the legal
strategy would fall under the ambit of the privilege.
In order to determine whether an attorney's role in such a case
includes public relations activities, the court first drew from Justice
Kennedy's plurality opinion in Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,94 which
argued that a "defense attorney may pursue lawful strategies to obtain
dismissal of an indictment or reduction of charges, including an at-
tempt to demonstrate in the court of public opinion that the client
does not deserve to be tried., 95 After examining a few analogous but
non-controlling cases, 96 the court explained that the question of
whether extrajudicial advocacy is a service warranting extension of
the privilege to public relations consultants required a consideration
of the rationales underlying the attorney-client privilege. 97 "Ifjustifi-
cation is to be found for such [an extension]," the court wrote, "it
must lie in the proposition that encouraging frank communication
among client, lawyers, and public relations consultations enhances
the administration ofjustice."9  The court then explained why, under
this approach, extension was appropriate:
[Stewart], like any investigatory target or criminal defendant, is con-
fronted with the broad power of the government. Without suggesting
any impropriety, the Court is well aware that the media, prosecutors, and
law enforcement personnel in cases like this often engage in activities that color
but it is an entirely different matter to craft a public relations strategy aimed at accom-
plishing such a focused goal within the context of a celebrity's criminal investigation.
93 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 326.
94 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
95 In re Grand Juy Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 327 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Gentile).
96 The cases were In re Copper Market Antitrust Litigation, 200 F.R.D. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), and
Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner (Calvin Klein I), 198 F.R.D. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). See
infra Part I.C. The court concluded that neither case resolved the privilege problem it
was evaluating. In re Grand jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 329.
97 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 329.
98 Id. at 330.
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public opinion, certainly to the detriment of the subject's general reputation but
also, in the most extreme cases, to the detriment of his or her ability to obtain a fair
trial. Moreover, it would be unreasonable to suppose that no prosecutor
ever is influenced by an assessment of public opinion in deciding
whether to bring criminal charges, as opposed to declining prosecution
or leaving matters to civil enforcement proceedings, or in deciding what
particular offenses to charge, decisions often of great consequence in this
Sentencing Guidelines era. Thus, in some circumstances, the advocacy of a cli-
ent's case in the public forum will be important to the client's ability to achieve a
fair and just result in pending or threatened litigation.9
Accordingly, the court held that in order to perform certain es-
sential functions, lawyers must be able to engage in protected com-
munications with public relations consultants. 00 The specific stan-
dard adopted by the court stated:
(1) confidential communications (2) between lawyers and public rela-
tions congultants (3) hired by the lawyers to assist them in dealing with
the media in cases such as this (4) that are made for the purpose of giv-
ing or receiving advice (5) directed at handling the client's legal prob-
lems are protected by the attorney-client privilege.'01
Under this standard, the court extended the privilege to all of the
communications at issue, except for two phone conversations and an
email. The phone calls, between Stewart and the individual public
relations consultant, discussed nothing more than the consultant's
view of a specific day's media coverage and a wire service story. The
email came from the public relations consultant to Stewart and re-
garded only the consultant's thoughts on a Wall Street Journal post-
ing.10 2 Regardless of whether Stewart's attorneys were present when
she spoke with the personnel of the public relations firm, under the
Kovel standard, the privilege applied to all the other communications
because they were made in order to obtain legal advice.
10 3
Interestingly, the court also explained that the privilege would not
have applied if Stewart had hired the firm directly, even if she had
done so to help aid her defense strategy.10 4 Although seemingly arbi-
trary, Judge Kaplan explained that this requirement follows Kovel be-
cause of the need to draw the line between a PR-firm-client privilege
99 Id. (emphases added).
100 Id. at 330-31. These essential functions include advising the client of legal risks associ-
ated with speaking publicly and the likely impact of doing so, attempting to avoid or limit
criminal charges brought by prosecutors against the client, and zealously seeking acquit-
tal or vindication. Id.
101 Id. at 331.
102 Id. at 331-32.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 331.
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and an extension of the attorney-client privilege to necessary "outside
help. ',10 5 If the public relations firm was already employed by the cli-
ent, it would be more difficult to determine whether the firm was
providing advice related to the formulation of a legal strategy or sim-
ply providing general public relations advice. Thus, the bright-line
rule is necessary to avoid confusion in future cases.
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas clearly presents a remarkable step in the
treatment of attorney-client communications by courts because of its
relatively unprecedented liberalization of the privilege. While the
holding has not yet been considered outside of the Southern District
of New York, 10 6 institutions besides courts have rapidly capitalized on
its implications. For example, public relations firms, unsurprisingly,
have publicized the decision to potential law firm clients while tout-
ing litigation-related services.' °7 As such, this issue will no doubt re-
surface in the Southern District and beyond.
C. Other Cases
While In re Grand Jury Subpoenas provides an adequate framework,
a few other cases from the Southern District of New York are worth
examining to illustrate other important aspects of the privilege exten-
sion problem as it relates to public relations consultants.' °8 These
cases are often considered together with In re Grand Jury Subpoenas by
commentators despite the fact that they all concern a civil dispute ra-
ther than a criminal trial.'0
105 Id. But see Gertsberg, supra note 49, at 1468 (opining that this portion of the opinion is at
odds with Koveo.
106 And even there, it has only been considered on one occasion. See Haugh v. Schroder Inv.
Mgmt. N. Am. Inc., No. 02 Civ.7955 DLC, 2003 WL 21998674, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25,
2003) (discussed infra in Part II.).
107 See Murphy, supra note 11, at 563 (noting public relation firms' treatment of the case).
108 These cases, while not exhaustive, do represent a majority of the occasions when courts
have opined on the issue of privilege extension to public relations consultants. See Mar-
tini & Willson, supra note 74, at 22-23 (noting that the issue underlying In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas has been infrequently addressed). For an additional case addressing an exten-
sion of the privilege to public relations consultants, see FTC v. GlaxoSmithKline, 294 F.3d
141 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In GlaxoSmithKline, the court did not consider communications be-
tween counsel and public relations personnel; rather, it considered whether disclosure of
otherwise privileged documents to a public relations consultant effected a waiver of the
privilege. Id. at 144. As such, the case is not entirely on point to the issues addressed by
this Comment because the public relations consultant clearly was not providing any type
of assistance with counsel's legal strategy.
109 As discussed in Part III, infra, the civil/criminal distinction should make a difference in
the court's (and the scholar's) analysis of the privilege issue.
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In 2000, the Southern District decided Calvin Klein Trademark
Trust v. Wachner,"" a case involving a dispute over a series of trade-
mark agreements."' Plaintiffs' counsel, in anticipation of filing suit,
hired a public relations firm, Robinson Lerer & Montgomery (RLM),
to consult on certain media-related matters. 112 After the suit com-
menced, defendants sought discovery of responsive documents and
testimony from RLM, and plaintiffs' attorneys asserted that the com-
munications were protected by the attorney-client privilege."
3
The court's review of some of the material in question reflected
the fact that the communications at issue appeared to consist of gen-
eral public relations advice, such as how to put favorable spin on de-
velopments in the litigation. 4 The court even noted that RLM's own
summary of the work done for the plaintiffs evidenced that most of its
duties involved general public relations activities such as reviewing
media coverage, contacting media outlets to comment on the litiga-
tion, and seeking out sympathetic reporters."' Not surprisingly, the
court did not extend the privilege to the communications at issue."'
Finding that the communications between the plaintiffs and RLM
were not made to seek legal advice, the court found the Kovel test un-
satisfied."' Even if RLM's consultations proved helpful to plaintiffs'
attorneys, this was not enough to justify application of the privilege
because RLM did not provide "functions materially different from
those that any ordinary public relations firm would have performed if
they had been hired directly by [the plaintiffs] .
Calvin Klein can be easily distinguished from In re Grand jury Sub-
poenas. To begin with, the former case is neither criminal in nature
nor does it rise to the level of a "high-profile" case, despite plaintiffs'
110 Calvin Klein I, 198 F.R.D. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
111 See Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner (Calvin Klein II), 123 F. Supp. 2d 731, 733
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
112 Calvin Klein I, 198 F.R.D. at 54.
113 Id. at 54. Plaintiffs' attorneys also claimed that some of the documents at issue were pro-
tected by the work-product doctrine. The work-product issue was analyzed separately and
does not bear on the discussion of the attorney-client privilege. See id. at 55-56 (analyzing
the work-product issue).
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 54-55.
117 Id. at 54.
118 Id. at 55. The court noted, "It may be that the modem client comes to court as prepared
to massage the media as to persuade the judge; but nothing in the client's communications for
the former purpose constitutes the obtaining of legal advice orjustifies a privileged status." Id. (em-
phasis added).
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argument that a "media crisis... would ensue."" 9 Furthermore, as
Judge Kaplan pointed out, the public relations firm in Calvin Klein
had a preexisting relationship with the plaintiffs, which made it
rather difficult to see how its advice was related to the litigation.
2 0
Accordingly, Calvin Klein has only a limited relationship to In re Grand
Jury Subpoenas in that they both addressed extending the privilege to
public relations consultants. The procedural posture and the factual
contexts of the cases are entirely at odds.
Similarly, in the case of In re Copper Market Antitrust Litigation,2 1 the
court addressed the privilege issue in a factual scenario that bears
only a surface similarity to In re Grand Jury Subpoenas. In In re Copper
Market, Sumitomo Corporation, a Japanese company, hired an
American public relations firm 2  to handle media-related issues aris-
ing from a copper-trading scandal.123 Plaintiffs sought documents re-
lating to the firm's public relations work done for Sumitomo's bene-
fit.
124
Rather than employing the Kovel analysis, the court found that
that the public relations firm served as the "functional equivalent of a
Sumitomo employee.' ' " Sumitomo had no experience dealing with
western media or high-profile litigation, and Sumitomo's Corporate
Communications Department, which normally would conduct its
public relations services, had a very limited mastery of the English
language.12 6 Relying on the principles set forth in Upjohn Co. v. United
States,12 7 the court held that there was no reason to distinguish a con-
sultant hired by the corporation from a paid employee if they both
act for the benefit of the corporation and aid attorneys in providing
119 Id. at 54. Perhaps among certain fashion and business circles, an internal dispute at Cal-
vin Klein would cause a media stir. Few could argue, however, that this would create the
type of media frenzy surrounding a celebrity criminal case or a particularly heinous
crime.
120 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated Mar. 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 329 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
121 200 F.R.D. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
122 That firm, interestingly enough, was RLM, the same one hired in Calvin Klein I Id. at
215.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 220.
126 Id. at 215.
127 449 U.S. 383 (1981). Upjohn is one of the seminal federal cases regarding issues that arise
when the attorney-client privilege is sought by a corporation. See NORMAN KRIVOSHA &
DAVID M. WILLIAMS, THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE CORPORATION 9-11
(George C. Landrith, III, ed., 1998) (explaining Upjohn's relevance to attorney-client
privilege issues where corporations are concerned).
May 2008]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITU'IONAL LA W
legal advice.128  Accordingly, the attorney-client privilege would ex-
tend to the public relations firm as it would to a Sumitomo employee
involved in the ligation.
While the court did choose to extend the privilege, as it later did
in In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, the reasoning underlying each decision
was entirely different.'3 ° It obviously would be impossible for an indi-
vidual defendant facing criminal charges to make the same assertion
as Sumitomo. Furthermore, the In re Copper Market court never ad-
dressed how the communications made by and to the public relations
firm aided Sumitomo's counsel in providing legal advice. Neverthe-
less, the case helps identify when the privilege issue potentially will
arise and may have future implications where a corporation faces
criminal sanctions.
The final case worth considering, Haugh v. Schroder Investment
Management North America Inc.,1 was decided by the Southern District
of New York less than two months after In re Grand Jury Proceedings.
32
The underlying case concerned a civil suit for age discrimination. 
1 3 3
Plaintiff's counsel retained Laura J. Murray, a public relations con-
sultant, to provide advice regarding media-related matters. 134 Accord-
128 See In re Copper Market, 200 F.R.D. at 219 (applying the Upjohn principles to determine that
the consultant at issue was no different from a person on the payroll of the company).
129 Id.
130 Judge Kaplan distinguished In re Copper Market, noting that Stewart made no assertion
similar to Sumitomo's. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated Mar. 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d
321, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
131 No. 02 Civ.7955 DLC, 2003 WL 21998674 (S.D.N.Y. Aug 25, 2003).
132 NX1VM Corp. v. O'Hara, a civil case recently decided by the Northern District of New York,
also touches on the issue of extending the attorney-client privilege to a litigation public
relations firm. 241 F.R.D. 109 (N.D.N.Y. 2007). In that case, the plaintiff, NXIVM Corp.,
sought to protect certain communications between it, the defendant O'Hara, and a pub-
lic relations firm, Sitrick Company. The court found that the
hiring of Sitrick was a facade and not for the purpose of helping O'Hara provide
legal advice to NXIVM but to give cover to communications between NXIVM, [a
private investigator], and Sitrick. O'Hara never used Sitrick's services and as far as
the record reveals neither did any other law firm working on behalf of NXfVM.
Id. at 140. The court further referred to O'Hara and his firm as "a mule" and stated that
"O'Hara's involvement was nothing more than a tool to achieve secrecy, not to give legal
advice." Id.
As such, it is clear that Sitrick was not aiding any lawyer in developing a legal strategy.
Instead, the court found that, like the public relations firm in Calvin Klein I, Sitrick "pro-
vided ordinary public relations advice." Id. at 141. Still, the court found it necessary to
address NXIVM's misplaced reliance on In re Grand Jury Subpoenas in dicta. The court
noted Judge Kaplan's "cogent reasoning that incorporates modern realities and inten-
tions," but was ultimately "not prepared to make [the] same deviation from the narrowly
tailored test of KoveL" Id.
133 Haugh, 2003 WIL 21998674, at *1.
134 Mi
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ing to counsel, Murray was hired "to help defend [plaintiff] from fur-
ther attacks in the media which he anticipated would occur once she
filed her lawsuit.'
13
5
After the lawsuit commenced, defendants sought discovery of six-
teen documents, fifteen of which were sent to Murray and one of
which was sent by Murray to counsel.3 6 Predictably, the plaintiff as-
serted that these documents were protected by attorney-client privi-
lege. The court wasted little paper in its opinion dismissing the privi-
lege claim. It found that even based on the plaintiffs description of
the communications, it did not appear that Murray was doing any-
thing other than what an "'ordinary public relations' advisor" would
do. 3 7 Contrary to the plaintiff's argument, the court held that In re
Grand Jury Subpoenas did not apply.3  The court noted that the plain-
tiff had failed to identify any legal objective that necessitated Murray's
involvement, such as Martha Stewart's claim that her public relations
consultant was helping to create a neutral legal environment.1
39
"Some attorneys may feel it is desirable at times to conduct a media
campaign," the court wrote, "but that decision does not transform
their coordination of a campaign into legal advice.'
40
The Haugh court, while quickly disposing of the privilege-
extension question, did identify an important issue. By distinguish-
ing In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, the court implicitly, but nonetheless
clearly, observed that there were different considerations concerning
the availability of the attorney-client privilege depending on whether
the underlying case was criminal or civil in nature. 14' This distinction
plays an essential role in determining whether the Constitution pro-
vides any support for extending the attorney-client privilege to public
relations consultants in high-profile criminal cases.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id. at *3.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 The Haugh court noted, "There is no need here to determine whether In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas was correctly decided." Id. At least one commentator has interpreted this as
the Haugh court questioning the In re Grand Juy Subpoenas decision. See Martini & Will-
son, supra note 74, at 23 n.57. Other commentators generally (and correctly) agree that
the Haugh court simply did not see In re GrandJuiy Subpoenas as having any relevance to
the assertion of the privilege at issue. See, e.g., Gertsberg, supra note 49, at 1471. I would
argue that the Haugh court, whether recognizing it or not, was alluding to the different
considerations that arise in criminal, as opposed to civil, cases.
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III. WHYJUDGE KAPLAN GOT IT RIGHT: MISPLACED CRITICISM,
CONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES, AND ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
That the attorney-client privilege should be extended in all cases
where a public relations consultant aids with a litigation matter is not
a winning argument. Indeed, the idea's most forceful expression in
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas did not hold as such, but rather, held that
the privilege should extend when the public relations consultant is
hired by counsel to assist for one specific purpose: neutralizing ex-
cessive media coverage in the court of public opinion. Although
even Judge Kaplan may not have realized it when writing the court's
opinion, such a result ensures that the constitutional rights of a per-
son accused in a high-profile criminal matter remain protected. Nev-
ertheless, in the five years since In re Grand Jury Subpoenas was de-
cided, a growing body of work has criticized the court's opinion for
improperly liberalizing the attorney-client privilege. A majority of
this criticism is misguided, as it often fails to consider the procedural
posture of the case as well as the continually evolving nature of mass
media.
For example, one common criticism is that the court's holding is
contrary to controlling precedent. Ann M. Murphy argues that an
extension of the privilege to public relations consultants is at odds
with Kovel.141 "[U] nderstanding public relations issues," she writes, "is
not comparable to understanding the complex Internal Revenue
Code, as was the case in Kovel."0 43 Murphy's statement, on its face, is
illogical. An attorney has a much better educational background for
understanding tax law and the tax code than he does for understand-
ing the intricacies of an effective litigation public relations strategy.1 4
The exorbitant number of media outlets available today, as well as the
142 See Murphy, supra note 11, at 586.
143 Id. See also Linas, supra note 12, at 420 (arguing that the assistance of public relations
consultants does not rise to the same level as the accountant's advice in Koveo.
144 Furthermore, in practice, Murphy's logic would make a court's treatment of the attorney-
client privilege under Kovel dependent on the court's somewhat arbitrary finding of what
constitutes "complex" subject matter. This is severely problematic. The determination by
the court of whether the subject "translated" by the third party was sufficiently complex as
to warrant an extension of the privilege would come only after the attorney had pre-
sumably decided that he did in fact need outside help and disclosed confidential material
to that third party. Such an environment would chill the likelihood that defense attor-
neys in criminal matters would consult necessary third parties, resulting in a loss of the
constitutionally protected right of due process, the right to effective and substantial coun-
sel, and the right to a fair trial. The attorney is in a better position to determine when he
or she needs outside help than ajudge is who is likely unfamiliar with the client and the
case, especially during the discovery stage.
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development of myriad public relations theories and techniques,
plainly demonstrates that effective, and necessary, litigation public re-
lations services demand more than the average attorney is prepared
to offer.' 45 As Steven Hantler and his colleagues explain, "What
makes litigation communications specialists 'experts' is that, in addi-
tion to being fluent in media relations, they have an understanding
of the legal world. This skill requires the ability to understand and
translate legalese into simple terms and concepts the public can
comprehend.' 46 I sincerely doubt that many lawyers would dispute
the difficulty in translating legal concepts to the layperson despite it
being a regular activity of the profession.
Thus, when an accused client's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights
are threatened by excessive media coverage-as they often are in
high-profile criminal cases-an attorney needs a public relations con-
sultant to help him understand how to effectively neutralize the
threat. Bringing the public perception of a high-profile manner to a
neutral point requires a carefully constructed and executed plan.
Leaving it in the hands of attorneys creates a much more likely
chance that their extrajudicial activity will cross the ethical boundary
and become materially prejudicial to a case, or worse, that such activ-
ity will violate the constitutional rights of the victim or the general
public.
Beyond Kovel, other authors have argued that In re Grand Jury Sub-
poenas also cannot be squared with other cases where the question of
extending the attorney-client privilege to public relations consultants
has been considered. 47 Cases like Calvin Klein and In re Copper Market,
while seeming to address the same issues, should be distinguished
from In re Grand Jury Proceedings. Both of these cases involved rela-
tively low-key disputes of a civil nature. In contrast, the high-profile
criminal context of In re Grand Jury Subpoenas necessitated that Ms.
Stewart's attorneys engage in extrajudicial advocacy in order to pre-
serve her Sixth Amendment rights. 48 Judge Kaplan, while not citing
the Constitution for support, noted in the In re Grand Jury Subpoenas
opinion that fair-trial rights are implicated in high-profile cases be-
cause they often involve activities by "the media, prosecutors, and law
145 See generally LITIGATION PUBLIC RELATIONS: COURTING PUBLIC OPINION (Susanne A.
Roschwalb & Richard A. Stack eds., 1995).
146 Hantler et al., supra note 53, at 21 (footnote omitted).
147 See, e.g., Linas, supra note 12, at 421-22 ("In re Grand Jury is... difficult to reconcile with
other cases that have extended the privilege to public relations consultants.").
148 See Hooker & Lange, supra note 47, at 664-65 (noting the unique concerns regarding
extrajudicial activity in high-profile criminal cases).
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enforcement personnel" that "color public opinion."'149 Along those
lines, confidentiality concerns vary tremendously depending on
whether a case is civil or criminal in nature. As Fred C. Zacharias
notes, "The relationship between criminal lawyers and their clients is
unique. To the extent secrecy helps maintain criminal defendants'
trust and contributes to quality representation, the Constitution
seems to give confidentiality its blessing.
1 5 0
Another prominent criticism of Judge Kaplan's opinion focuses
on a utilitarian view of the privilege, 5 ' arguing that In re Grand Jury
Subpoenas creates a result contrary to the privilege's historical justifi-
cations. 5' Because extension to public relations consultants does not
further any of these "historical justifications," such an extension is an
improper liberalization of evidentiary privileges. Deborah Bartel has
explained the basis of the utilitarian justification:
Wigmore formulated the classic utilitarian balancing test to justify pre-
serving the confidentiality of client communications to lawyers: the in-
jury to the attorney-client relationship by the disclosure of the communi-
cation must be greater than the benefit that would be gained thereby for
the correct disposal of the litigation. Utilitarians maintain the attorney-
client privilege exists to protect a relationship that is a mainstay of our
system ofjustice: lawyer and client. The privilege is vital to encouraging
full and frank communication between clients and legal advisors and to
promoting the efficient administration ofjustice.1,
3
Those in opposition to an extension of the privilege to public re-
lations consultants frequently argue that such an extension does not
satisfy the Wigmore balancing test described by Bartel."54 In the ab-
sence of the privilege for public relations firms, the argument goes, a
client will not be any less likely to disclose all of the relevant facts and
information needed by an attorney to provide effective counsel.
Thus, no overwhelming benefits exist that outweigh the obstruction
of the court's search for "truth."
This simply is not true in the context of a high-profile criminal
matter. As already discussed in Part I, a high-profile defendant's fair-
149 In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated Mar. 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d 321, 330 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
150 Zacharias, supra note 34, at 356-57 (footnote omitted).
151 This is not to be confused with the non-utilitarian view of the privilege, which is based on
individual rights, sometimes focusing on those rights created by the Constitution. For an
example of the non-utilitarian viewpoint, see Bartel, supra note 33, at 1363.
152 See Murphy, supra note 11, at 586-87; Linas, supra note 12, at 423.
153 Bartel, supra note 33, at 1364 (footnotes omitted).
154 See Linas, supra note 12, at 423 ("The extension of the privilege to a public relations firm
does nothing to encourage a client's frank disclosure of material information to his at-
torney.").
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trial rights make extrajudicial legal advocacy an imperative." 5 Public
relations consultants can provide an enormous benefit to defendants
by aiding their counsel in forming a focused and effective litigation
public relations strategy. Furthermore, public relations consultants
may understand that certain information is needed from a client for
public advocacy purposes, which otherwise may not normally be dis-
closed to an attorney. This may prove to be beneficial to the basic le-
gal services that the attorney provides. Thus, by preserving the confi-
dentiality of communications made with public relations consultants,
an extension of the privilege provides the benefit of ensuring effec-
tive advice from counsel, thereby coming into harmony with the utili-
tarian justification for the privilege.
56
Moreover, the version of Wigmore's balancing test adopted by
privilege utilitarians may be inappropriate in the context of a crimi-
nal case for two reasons. First, the test incorrectly assumes that in-
formation relevant to the crime will be lost because of the invocation
of the privilege.1 57 Second, the balancing test is moot in a high-profile
criminal case because the constitutional implications will always tip
the balance in favor of confidentiality. "[A] lthough the instrumental
underpinnings of the attorney-client privilege may not in every case
provide an adequate rationale for protecting confidences shared be-
tween a criminal defendant and his lawyer, the [F]ifth and [S]ixth
[A]mendments provide such persons with a right to privilege which
cannot be balanced away. '" 8 Put another way, a criminal defendant's
constitutional rights create a justification for the attorney-client privi-
lege that trumps any of the historical justifications offered for the
privilege. Courts should recognize a constitutionally grounded privi-
lege, and by doing so, should realize that in certain situations, exten-
sion of the privilege to public relations consultants is appropriate be-
155 See Hantler et al., supra note 53, at 7-8 ("High-profile civil litigation is not just decided in
the courts; it is also decided in the court of public opinion.... [I]t is within a lawyer's
role, therefore, to work with reporters on their stories to ensure accurate reporting.").
156 See Nelson, supra note 31, at 384 ("While the privilege may suppress important evidence,
it has been determined that the need to allow the attorney to provide sound legal advice
generally outweighs any disadvantage of withholding evidence in a particular case."
(footnote omitted)).
157 See Bartel, supra note 33, at 1418-19 (explaining that since a client can be questioned
about the underlying facts of a case regardless of a privilege claim, no relevant informa-
tion is ultimately lost to the fact-finder). Bartel posits that the only time that such infor-
mation would be lost to the fact-finder is when a client tells one story to his attorney and
then another to the fact-finder, for example, when he is trying to strengthen a self-
defense claim. Id. at 1419. For several different reasons, this is a rare occurrence. Id.
158 Note, supra note 42, at 487.
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cause it is essential to counsel's ability to further his or her client's
fair-trial rights.'59
One final criticism of In re Grand Jury Subpoenas should also be ad-
dressed. Some commentators suggest that the case was wrongly de-
cided because it relied too heavily on the effect of public influence
on prosecutorial discretion.' 6° Since there is only a small possibility
that extrajudicial advocacy can actually impact a prosecutor's deci-
sion to file charges, such efforts should not be deemed essential to
effective legal counsel. Again, this argument is misplaced. While it is
certainly true that there are several contributing factors in a prosecu-
tor's decision to file initial or additional charges against a client, 16' the
effect of public opinion upon prosecutorial discretion, though inca-
pable of proof, cannot be ignored. 162 Deniza Gertsberg explains that
"prosecutors and the media are intertwined where each influences
the other. Objective information ... is framed to inflame the com-
munity. Intense public reactions may influence prosecutors to bring
initial or heavier charges.' 63 Such an intense public reaction was cer-
tainly present in Martha Stewart's case, which seemed "wholly out of
proportion, particularly when compared to the obvious corporate
improprieties of 2001.",6
Regardless, even if public reaction is but one small factor of the
many that influence a prosecutor's decision to bring charges, the se-
159 Critics of Judge Kaplan's decision typically fail to address the constitutional issues impli-
cated by a criminal trial. For example, Ann M. Murphy only offers that "[p]rivileges 'are
not favored,' even if they have constitutional roots." Murphy, supra note 11, at 561 (citing
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175 (1979)). Herbert actually posits that "Evidentiary
privileges in litigation are not favored, and even those rooted in the Constitution must
give way in proper circumstances." 441 U.S. at 175 (footnote omitted).
160 See, e.g., Linas supra note 12, at 423-24 ("The In re Grand Jury decision is... problematic
because the court partially rests its holding on the influence that public opinion has on
prosecutorial discretion.").
161 For a detailed recounting of the process that led to the charges against Martha Stewart,
seeSeigel & Slobogin, supra note 79, at 1114-17.
162 See Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L. REv. 669,
688 (identifying public opinion and personal ambition as factors that may weigh heavily
on prosecutorial discretion); see also Moses, supra note 50, at 1833 ("[An] issue for corpo-
rate counsel comes from the wide discretion given prosecutors in deciding whether a
corporate violation is a civil or criminal matter."). The effect of specific factors on prose-
cutorial discretion lies predominantly on speculation. It is certainly difficult to imagine
the existence of empirical evidence documenting the link between public opinion and
prosecutorial discretion. The lack of such evidence, however, is not a reason for courts to
ignore the potential effect excessive media coverage may have on such discretion since
fair-trial and due-process rights are at issue.
163 Gertsberg, supra note 49, at 1462 (footnote omitted).
164 Schroeder, supra note 2, at 2025.
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verity of criminal penalties, along with the rights thus implicated,
demand that each such factor be adequately considered and ad-
dressed by counsel where possible. Thus, an attorney must attempt to
neutralize any negative public perception that arises from excessive
media coverage of a high-profile client and which may unduly influ-
ence prosecutorial discretion. 165 Communications made with the cli-
ent in providing this legal service would undoubtedly be privileged.
Assuming, arguendo, that such extrajudicial goals may only be accom-
plished with the assistance of a public relations firm, the privilege
should extend to the communications with the firm that relate to
those goals. This is, essentially, the holding of In re Grand Jury Subpoe-
nas.
A final consideration remains. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas only ad-
dressed the propriety of extending the privilege where the firm was
employed to neutralize public pressure on regulators and prosecutors
to bring charges against Ms. Stewart. I would argue that in order to
preserve the fair-trial rights of clients involved in high-profile crimi-
nal matters, the privilege should also extend to public relations firms
employed by counsel with the end goal of neutralizing jury contami-
nation caused by the media and the government.
Unlike the issue of prosecutorial discretion, there is clear evi-
dence that jury contamination will likely result when a client is nega-
tively portrayed by an aggressive media. For example, one study cited
by Steven Hantler showed that "even modest pretrial publicity can
prejudice potential jurors against a defendant.' 66 The study revealed
that "80% of jurors exposed to prejudicial articles found against the
defendant, compared with only 39% of those who were not exposed
to pretrial publicity.' 67 Again, this study focused only on modest pre-
trial publicity. In the case of a Martha Stewart, where pretrial public-
ity can be nearly unfathomable, the potential impact on the jury pool
will be much greater. 168 Jury contamination clearly presents a chal-
165 Joseph W. Martini and Charles F. Willson even argue that one "open issue is whether
counsel's failure to advocate in the media gives rise to a malpractice or ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claim by a defendant confronted by a prosecution inspired and moti-
vated by bad press." Martini & Willson, supra note 74, at 24.
166 Hantler et al., supra note 53, at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dirk C.
Gibson & Mariposa E. Padilla, Litigation Public Relations Problems and Limits, 25 PUB. REL.
REV. 215, 216 (1999)).
167 Id.
168 See, e.g., Judge Changes Tactics for Martha Stewart Trial: Looking forJurors Who Can Decide Case
Solely on Evidence, Despite Heary Pre-trial Publicity, GAZETTE. (Montreal), Jan. 23, 2004, at B8
("The judge in the Martha Stewart trial appears to have given up on finding 12 people
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lenge to a defendant's ability to obtain a fair trial. Any attorney seek-
ing to properly counsel a client involved in a high-profile criminal
matter must take steps to neutralize the threat. Because the attorney
will not likely be skilled in dealing with such an aggressive media, he
or she will need outside help in the form of a public relations firm.
It follows that in order to facilitate the formulation of a legal strat-
egy, which includes an extrajudicial advocacy plan aimed at neutraliz-
ing jury contamination, the attorney-client privilege should apply to
all communications among client, attorney, and public relations con-
sultant that are necessary to achieve that end. Concerns that this will
lead to a general PR-firm-client privilege are easily assuaged. Since
the privilege would only apply to public relations activities aimed at
neutralizing potential jury contamination, attorneys are likely to ap-
ply restraint in their extrajudicial efforts. 69 Otherwise, they would
risk waiver of the privilege when the public relations activities were
not legal in nature; they might even risk ethical sanctions where their
extrajudicial advocacy materially prejudices the judicial process."'
CONCLUSION
Unfortunately for Martha Stewart, it seems she is always being
made out as an example, whether by the SEC, craft-making mothers,
or by a lowly law student such as myself (I would venture to guess that
she is slightly more concerned about the former two). Ms. Stewart's
legal conundrum and the case of In re GrandJuiy Subpoenas demon-
strate the complex interplay between the media and the law in a high-
profile criminal case. Such a case, by its nature, implicates certain
constitutional protections because of the potential threats excessive
media coverage pose to an accused's fair-trial and due-process rights.
completely unfamiliar with the gracious-living guru, instead zeroing in on those who say
they can be fair despite the heavy pre-trial publicity.").
169 Adding substance to this claim is the fact that attorneys may be reluctant to liberally claim
the protection of the attorney-client privilege because it is traditionally perceived in a
negative manner. Timothy P. Glynn explains that "the public takes a dim view of asser-
tions of the attorney-client and other privileges by those under scrutiny in well-publicized
disputes or scandals, such as the tobacco litigation and the recent Enron debacle." Glyn-
n, supra note 21, at 61.
170 The In re GrandJuiy Subpoenas holding, which requires the attorney (rather than the cli-
ent) to hire the consultants, enforces the idea that the privilege would not extend beyond
the boundaries necessary to accomplish the specific goal of neutralizing public opinion.
Although seemingly arbitrary, it helps to ensure that the consultant would not be provid-
ing general public relations advice rather than services necessary to effective and substan-
tial legal counsel. See In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated Mar. 24, 2003, 265 F. Supp. 2d
321, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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The Constitution, however, has received little consideration in the
discussion of extending the attorney-client privilege to public rela-
tions consultants. It should play a more central role. The protections
afforded by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments support Judge Kaplan's
decision in In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, and in the future, courts should
not hesitate to extend the privilege in such a manner.
It must be kept in mind that In re Grand Jury Subpoenas is extremely
limited in application, and in no way mandates that communications
with public relations consultants will be subject to the attorney-client
privilege in all cases. Instead, the case merely recognizes the impor-
tant aspects of a high-profile criminal case and the impact that an ag-
gressive media may have on the rights of the accused. As such, any
analysis of the case or similar cases that frames the issue as whether
the privilege should ever apply to public relations consultants mis-
conceives the extent of Judge Kaplan's holding. The case, like this
Comment, addresses an extension of the privilege in a very limited
set of circumstances. Celebrity trials, though covered sensationally in
the media, are rare occurrences and in most other high-profile cases,
particularly investigations and trials involving heinous crimes, clients
will not likely have the resources to employ sophisticated public rela-
tions consultants as part of their legal team. Though this problem
will certainly rear its head in the near future, it will not be widespread
enough to warrant fear that the law of attorney-client privilege has
been turned upside down. On the rare occasion when the issue does
in fact surface, courts and commentators should spend as much time
considering the constitutional issues involved in criminal proceedings
as they do considering Dean Wigmore's likely thoughts on the mat-
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